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MAINTAINING A PICTURE-PERFECT ENVIRONMENT: SHIFTS
IN THE STANDING DOCTRINE AFTER LEAGUE OF
CONSERVATION VOTERS V. TRUMP
I. FRAMING THE LANDSCAPE: AN INTRODUCTION INTO THE
REGULATION OF OIL DRILLING
Since the 1800s, the oil drilling business has steadily increased
in the United States.1  By the early 1900s, the United States had
“turned to oil as its primary natural resource,” and by the mid-
1900s, oil was the second largest income generator in the United
States.2  Today, oil and drilling account for a large component of
the United States’ economy.3  Despite the importance of oil to the
economy, oil and drilling remain a frequently-debated and contro-
versial activity.4  Issues ranging from federalism concerns over who
can control lands for oil and drilling purposes to environmental
concerns over the effect of oil drilling on animal wildlife have
plagued the oil and drilling industry.5
In 1953, as a response to the federalism battle for land control
between states and the federal government, Congress enacted the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) and delineated what
lands the federal government owned for oil and drilling purposes.6
1. See generally OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT,
https://www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2019) (dis-
cussing history of oil activity in United States).
2. Id. (describing influence of oil industry on United States economy).
3. See Bob Iaccino, How Much Does Oil And Gas Drive U.S. GDP?, OPEN MARKETS
(June 4, 2019), http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/15157/how-much-does-oil-
and-gas-drive-u-s-gdp (detailing effect of oil and gas industry on U.S. economy).
4. See 7 ways oil and gas drilling is bad for the environment, THE WILDERNESS SOCI-
ETY (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.wilderness.org/articles/blog/7-ways-oil-and-gas-
drilling-bad-environment (listing negative effects of oil drilling on environment).
“Drilling projects operate around the clock, disrupting wildlife, water sources,
human health, recreation and other aspects of public lands that were set aside and
held in trust for the American people.” Id.  (describing how oil drilling affects
every aspect of environment).
5. See Daniel S. Miller, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in Off-
shore Oil and Gas Development, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 402-04, 408 (1984) (detailing
history of federalism concerns in offshore oil and gas development); see also Alex-
andra B. Klass, Federalism “Collisions” in Energy Policy, THE REGULATORY VIEW (Nov.
19, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/11/19/klass-federalism-collisions-
energy-policy/ (delineating areas of energy policy under federal control and areas
that remain under state control); see generally 7 ways oil and gas drilling is bad for the
environment supra note 4 (discussing environmental impact of oil and gas drilling).
6. See OCS Lands Act History, supra note 1 (discussing OCSLA history and
purpose).
(329)
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The OCSLA gave the federal government control over all offshore
lands and allowed the Secretary of the Interior the power to lease
the lands for oil and gas development.7  The OCSLA also granted
the President the power to remove Outer Continental Shelf Lands
(OCS Lands) from the lands available for oil leasing.8  Past presi-
dents have exercised the power granted under Section 12(a) of the
OCSLA to protect certain lands from the inherent dangers associ-
ated with oil and gas development.9  As concerns over the negative
effects of oil drilling on the environment increased in recent years,
the Obama Administration removed large portions of land from
OCSLA jurisdiction to ameliorate some of these concerns.10
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump11 arose in response to
President Trump’s attempts to revoke President Obama’s land with-
drawals.12  The plaintiffs sued President Trump, asserting the Presi-
dent had exceeded his authority both under the Constitution and
under the OCSLA powers granted to him.13  To decide the case,
the District Court of Alaska engaged in highly detailed procedural
discussions, as well as substantive legal discussions.14
Part I of this Note discusses the factual developments that led
to this controversy.15  Part II covers the legal background the court
relied on to decide League of Conservation Voters.16  Part III explores
the discussion the court undertook at the motion to dismiss stage of
7. Id. (describing OCSLA granted powers).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018) (outlining President’s power under OCSLA).
The OCSLA describes OCS lands as all submerged lands lying seaward of state
coastal waters (three miles offshore) which are under U.S. jurisdiction.  See OCS
Lands Act History, supra note 1 (defining what OCS lands are).
9. See Kevin O. Leske, “Un-Shelfing” Lands Under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA): Can A Prior Executive Withdrawal Under Section 12(a) Be Trumped
by A Subsequent President?, 26 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 13 (2017) (describing several
instances of presidents withdrawing lands based on their OCSLA power).
10. See Exec. Order No. 13754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90669 (Dec. 9, 2016) (describing
President Obama’s reasons for withdrawing lands from OCS).  President Obama
discussed the changes in sea ice conditions, changes in fishing, hunting, and whal-
ing, and changes in the region’s ecosystem due to oil and drilling activities. Id.
(detailing harmful effects of oil and drilling activities on OCS lands).
11. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985 (D. Alaska
2019) (holding President Trump could not revoke President Obama’s
withdrawals).
12. See generally id. at 990-91 (describing events leading to plaintiff’s filing
complaint).
13. Id. at 991 (outlining plaintiff’s main arguments).
14. See generally id. 993-1001 (engaging in discussion of both procedural and
substantive challenges to lawsuit).
15. For a discussion of the facts of the case, see infra notes 20-51 and accom-
panying text.
16. For a discussion of the background of the standing doctrine, see infra
notes 52-130 and accompanying text.
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the case.17  Part IV analyzes the court’s decision.18  Lastly, Part V
examines the future of the standing doctrine in environmental case
law and the role, if any, that League of Conservation Voters will play in
shaping that future.19
II. ZOOMING IN ON THE FOCAL POINT: FACTS OF LEAGUE OF
CONSERVATION VOTERS V. TRUMP
In the 1800s, residents of California began drilling and discov-
ering oil.20  As oil and gas became profitable, controversies between
Texas and the federal government ensued.21  In an effort to ap-
pease both sides, Congress passed several new statutes, including
the OCSLA, that explicitly “provided for federal jurisdiction over
submerged lands in the OCS .”22  States would remain in control of
lands that were within “[three] International Nautical Miles of the
coast.”23  In passing the OCSLA, Congress gave the Secretary of the
Interior the power to lease OCS lands for mineral and oil develop-
ment purposes.24  The OCSLA was predominantly enacted to pro-
mote the oil business, but due to concerns over the harmful
environmental impact of oil drilling, the OCSLA gave the acting
president the power to “from time to time, withdraw from disposi-
tion any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”25
17. For a summary of the district court’s holding, see infra notes 131-169 and
accompanying text.
18. For an analysis of the district court’s decision, see infra notes 170-201 and
accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the potential impact League of Conservation Vot-
ers can have on the standing doctrine, see infra notes 202-214 and accompanying
text.
20. See OCS Lands Act History, supra note 1 (providing history of oil drilling
activity in U.S.).
21. See id. (describing conflicts between states and federal government for
control of oil drilling lands).
22. See id. (explaining main purpose behind passing OCSLA).
23. See Outer Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, https:/
/www.boem.gov/oil-gas-energy/leasing/outer-continental-shelf (last visited Aug.
27, 2019) (explaining boundaries of OCS lands).  Texas, Louisiana, and the Gulf
Coast of Florida have slightly larger boundaries. Id. (outlining boundaries of cer-
tain states).  Additionally, Texas and the Gulf Coast of Florida measure the bound-
aries by marine leagues, while Louisiana measures the boundary by U.S. nautical
miles, which both differ from International Nautical Miles. Id. (describing the dif-
ferent measurement systems used).
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018) (granting Secretary of the Interior power to lease
lands to promote oil business).
25. 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018) (granting presidents power to remove un-
leased lands from available lands); see also League of Conservation Voters v.
Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1016 (D. Alaska, 2019) (describing presidents’
power under OCSLA).
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In 2016, President Obama issued Executive Order 13754
“Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience” (Obama’s Order).26
Obama’s Order withdrew from leasing disposition around 128 mil-
lion acres of lands in the Northern Bering Sea off the coast of
Alaska.27  Per Obama’s Order, the lands removed could not be
leased for “oil and gas leasing purposes,” and the lands would re-
main unavailable for an unspecified period of time.28  To support
his withdrawal of the lands, President Obama reiterated the impor-
tance of protecting the region’s ecosystem and preserving the
area’s habitat and marine wildlife.29  President Obama highlighted
the dangers of climate change and its harmful effects on ecosys-
tems, wildlife, and biodiversity.30
In response to Obama’s Order, in 2017, President Trump is-
sued Executive Order 13795 “Implementing an America-First Off-
shore Energy Strategy” (Trump’s Order).31  Trump’s Order
revoked the withdrawals of land that were secured by Obama’s Or-
der.32  In an effort to promote the United States’ economy,
Trump’s Order made the lands available for oil and gas develop-
ment.33  Additionally, Trump’s Order established a new stream-
lined process for companies looking to acquire permits for seismic
research on OCS lands.34  The Trump administration further pro-
claimed its commitment to ensuring the United States maintained
its status as a world leader in the energy sector.35  In April 2017, the
Secretary of the Interior attempted to comply with Trump’s Order
26. See Exec. Order No. 13754, supra note 10 (describing Obama’s Order).
27. See id. (using President’s OCSLA power to remove millions of acres of
OCS lands).
28. Id. (designating multiple acres of lands as unavailable for oil and drilling
due to serious environmental concerns).
29. Id. (explaining importance of protecting natural habitat of millions of
species).
30. Id. (discussing how climate change as well as sea ice melting pose threat to
animals in OCS region).
31. See Exec. Order No. 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 (April 2017) (considering
oil and drilling important drivers of U.S. economy which necessitate easier access).
“It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage energy exploration and
production, including on the Outer Continental Shelf, in order to maintain the
Nation’s position as a global energy leader . . . .” Id. (committing resources to task
of remaining global leader in energy activities).
32. Id. (revoking Obama’s order and streamlining permit process to facilitate
oil and drilling activities).
33. Id. (designating previously withdrawn lands as newly available for leasing
to promote oil activities that drive U.S. economy).
34. Id. (urging Secretary of the Interior to designate streamlined process for
granting seismic surveying permits quicker).
35. Id. (emphasizing importance of maintaining global position as leader of
energy developments).  “America must put the energy needs of American families
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol31/iss2/4
2020] MAINTAINING A PICTURE-PERFECT ENVIRONMENT 333
by issuing an order to expedite seismic activity permits.36  Several
environmental organizations, concerned about the environmental
ramifications of Trump’s Order, filed suit against the President and
the Secretary of the Interior.37
On May 3, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against Presi-
dent Trump in the District of Alaska.38  The complaint alleged the
President had violated the Property Clause of the Constitution and
had exceeded the statutory authority granted to him under the OC-
SLA.39  In July of 2017 and September of 2017, the American Petro-
leum Institute and the State of Alaska were added as defendants in
the case.40  Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the com-
plaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim for which relief can be granted.41
During the motion to dismiss stage, the defendants raised sev-
eral arguments in support of their motion.42  One of the defen-
dant’s arguments relied upon the theory that the plaintiffs lacked
and businesses first . . . .” Id. (announcing energy business was primary focus of
Trump’s administration).
36. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985, 991 (D.
Alaska 2018) (outlining Secretary of the Interior’s attempts at complying and im-
plementing Trump’s Order).
37. Id. at 991 (discussing harmful effects of seismic surveying and their impact
on environment). The environmental organizations involved in the case are: (1)
League of Conservation Voters, (2) Natural Resources Defense Council, (3) Sierra
Club, (4) Alaska Wilderness League, (5) Defenders of Wildlife, (6) Northern
Alaska Environmental Center, (7) Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indige-
nous Lands, (8) Center for Biological Diversity, Greenpeace, Inc., and (9) The
Wilderness Society. Id. (listing all organizations that brought lawsuit against Presi-
dent Trump).
38. Id. (reciting background facts leading to plaintiff’s complaint).
39. Id. (citing plaintiffs’ main arguments raised in complaint against Presi-
dent Trump’s actions).
40. Id. (describing reasons for defendants’ intervening in pending action
against President Trump).
41. League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 992 (outlining defendants’
attempts to dismiss case).
42. Id. at 993 (listing four separate theories defendants raised to support their
motion to dismiss).  Defendants asserted dismissal for: (1) sovereign immunity, (2)
lack of private right of action, (3) court’s inability to grant declaratory judgments
against president, and (4) lack of standing. Id. at 993-1001 (discussing every the-
ory raised by defendants and finding for plaintiffs in each one).  American Petro-
leum Institute filed a separate motion to dismiss based on a claim that only the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia could hear the case. Id.
at 1001-04 (discussing API’s separate motion to dismiss claim). The only claim dis-
cussed in this Note is standing. For a discussion of standing in the Note, see infra
notes 131-169 and accompanying text.
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standing to challenge President Trump’s actions.43  The defendants
argued the case should be dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked
(a) imminent harm, (b) geographic specificity, and (c) particular-
ized harm.44  In support of their motion, the defendants high-
lighted the process the Department of the Interior would have to
follow before any seismic activity or oil and drilling could happen
on the lands.45  Because of this, the defendants claimed there was
not a threat of imminent harm to the plaintiffs, and the case should
be dismissed for lack of standing.46  The court discussed the stand-
ing test, focusing specifically on the first prong of the standing test,
finding the plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to survive the mo-
tion to dismiss stage.47
In June 2018, the parties cross-filed for summary judgment.48
At that stage, the court refused to revisit the issue of standing previ-
ously discussed at the motion to dismiss phase of the case.49  In-
stead, the court engaged in a discussion of the substantive legal
merits of the case, concluding the President did not have the power
43. Id. at 995 (describing defendants’ position that plaintiffs failed to provide
facts showing they had standing to sue).
44. Id. at 995-96 (listing defendants’ various concerns with plaintiffs’ lack of
factual allegations to support standing).
45. See Federal Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), League of Conservation Voters v.
Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. Alaska 2019) (No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG), 2017 WL
6998954 (discussing steps that required completion before OCS lands could be
leased).  Among the steps necessary to proceed before leasing lands are: (1) “The
Department of the Interior [(Interior)] prepares a Five-Year Leasing Program con-
taining a five-year schedule of proposed lease sales,” (2) “Interior then solicits bids
and issues leases for particular offshore leasing areas identified in the Five-Year
Leasing Program,” (3) “Interior reviews and determines whether to approve the
lessees’ more specific exploration plans,” and (4) “Interior and those affected state
and local governments review an additional and more detailed development and
production plan from the lessee if the lessee decides to move forward with
production.”
46. Id. (discussing factors favoring lack of standing).
47. See League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985, 995-
1001 (D. Alaska 2019) (undertaking long discussion of standing test and finding
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled enough information to meet test).  The court fo-
cused on the “imminent harm” element of a standing claim and the three ele-
ments necessary to prove that prong of the test. Id. (focusing on (a) imminent
harm, (b) geographic specificity, (c) particularized harm).
48. See League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1017
(D. Alaska 2019) (reciting facts that led to plaintiffs and defendants filing cross
motions for Summary Judgment).
49. Id. at 1019-20 (refusing to revisit lack of standing argument first addressed
at motion to dismiss stage).  The court noted that the standard for summary judg-
ment is higher than the standard for motion to dismiss, yet the court stated that
the plaintiffs met the burden. See id. (finding plaintiffs met burden of proof for
summary judgment but never discussing specific facts plaintiffs pled to survive
motion).
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under the OCSLA to undo actions taken by previous presidents.50
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated Congress had explicitly
granted the President the power to withdraw lands from the Outer
Continental Shelf, but Congress had not given the President the
power to revoke the withdrawals made by prior presidents.51
III. FLIPPING THROUGH PAST ALBUMS: BACKGROUND ON HOW THE
STANDING DOCTRINE CAME TO FRUITION
Whether the Framers of the Constitution intended standing to
be a bar to certain suits has been an ongoing battle in the legal
system.52  Despite the Framers never including a standing require-
ment in the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court of the
United States has previously reasoned the standing requirement is
implicitly stated in the language of the Constitution.53  Specifically,
the Court held that a suit can only be brought if the person bring-
ing the suit has “personally suffered” by the action they are com-
plaining about.54  In environmental law, the doctrine of standing is
even more nuanced.55  Standing plays an important role in the con-
text of environmental lawsuits because they typically involve some
level of concern for the welfare of the general public, as opposed to
the focus on the welfare of the individual as seen in most non-envi-
ronmental lawsuits.56
50. See generally id. at 1020-30 (analyzing text and purpose of OCSLA to con-
clude that President Trump did not have power to revoke withdrawals made by
President Obama).
51. Id. at 1030 (concluding President Trump exceeded statutory authority
under OCSLA).  In May of 2019, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See also League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, CLI-
MATE CASE CHART, http://climatecasechart.com/case/league-conservation-voters-
v-trump/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) (listing full procedural history for case ac-
tion).  As of November 2019, this appeal is still pending in the Ninth Circuit. Id.
(listing procedural posture in case).
52. See Standing, GEO. ENVTL. LAW & POL’Y INST. http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/
research_archive/standing/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2019) (discussing history behind
doctrine of standing).
53. Id. (describing Supreme Court’s position regarding standing doctrine).
54. Constitutional Standards: Injury in Fact, Causation, and Redressability, LEGAL
INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/
clause-1/constitutional-standards-injury-in-fact-causation-and-redressability (last
visited Nov. 24, 2019) (discussing test for proving standing); see also Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (discussing need for plaintiff to have personal stake in
case to prove standing).
55. See Georgetown University Law Center, supra note 52 (explaining standing
in context of environmental policy).
56. See Robin Kundis, Standing and Environmental Law: An Overview 1-2 (Fla.
State Univ. Coll. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 425, 2009), https://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1536583 (explaining public welfare
component of environmental laws).
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A. Constitutional Requirements
When the Framers drafted the Constitution, they intended to
give the courts the power to hear only actual “cases . . . [and] con-
troversies.”57  As scores of cases plagued the courts, the Court read
the “cases . . . [and] controversies” language to mean the plaintiffs
must meet a minimum threshold of personal injury to bring a case
to court.58  Although the Court grounded the standing doctrine in
constitutional requirements, critics argue the doctrine of standing
is merely a judicially-imposed requirement that was not the legisla-
tive intent of the Framers.59
To support this notion, many critics state that before the mid-
twentieth century, there was no separate standing doctrine.60  In-
stead, plaintiffs could bring the case to court if “it fit one of the
recognized forms of action.”61  There was no separate requirement
that the plaintiffs be personally injured by the action they were
complaining about.62  Despite this, proponents of the standing doc-
trine agree with the Supreme Court’s finding that the “cases . . .
[and] controversies” language of the Constitution implicitly states
the need for a plaintiff to have suffered personal injury to bring an
issue to the court.63  Still, by the 1930s, standing was not recognized
as an important concept stemming from the language of the Con-
stitution.64  In fact, the standing doctrine did not evolve into its pre-
sent form until “the passage of major environmental statutes in the
early 1970s.”65
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (enumerating powers of judiciary).
58. Georgetown University Law Center, supra note 52 (explaining emergence
and requirements of standing doctrine).
59. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doc-
trine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 689 (2004) (acknowledging arguments that doctrine
of standing did not exist prior to judges erecting doctrine).
60. See id. (discussing critiques against doctrine of standing).
61. See id. (explaining how complaints met “cases and controversies” require-
ment prior to doctrine of standing).
62. See id. 689-90 (noting requirement for bringing case to court was whether
plaintiff had legal claim instead of whether plaintiff had standing to sue).
63. See id. at 692 (comparing differing views on doctrine of standing).
64. Andrew Long, Standing & Consensus: Globalism in Massachusetts v. EPA, 23
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 73, 82 (2008) (discussing relatively modern emergence of
standing doctrine).
65. Id. at 84 (explaining environmental law’s influence on doctrine of
standing).
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B. Environmental Caselaw’s Influence on Standing
Environmental law has played an outsized role in the develop-
ment and evolution of the standing doctrine.66  Since the 1970s,
major environmental statutes have included provisions that allow
members of the public to bring an action against an agency or in-
dustry whose activity is impacting the environment.67 These statutes
have led to private citizens bringing various challenges in defense
of the environment.68  Due to these challenges, environmental case
law has led to key judicial decisions that shaped the doctrine of
standing into its present day form.69
In the 1972 case Sierra Club v. Morton,70 the Supreme Court
began trying to apply the doctrine of standing to environmental law
cases.71  The Sierra Club, an organization dedicated to defending
and preserving the country’s forests and national parks, brought
suit against the then Secretary of the Interior, Rogers Morton.72  In
its complaint, the Sierra Club sought a declaratory judgment and
injunction to prevent federal officials from approving the construc-
tion of a thirty-five million dollar ski complex in the Sierra Nevada
territory known as Mineral King Valley.73  The ski resort would host
more than fourteen thousand daily visitors, include ski lifts, lodging
accommodations, and restaurants, and require the construction of
a highway through the Sequoia National Park.74
The Sierra Club sought to stop the project in an effort to pro-
tect the environmental landscape, forests, and game refuge of the
Mineral King Valley.75  Initially, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California found the plaintiffs had stand-
ing to bring the case to court, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the
decision.76  The plaintiffs appealed, and the case eventually
66. See id. (acknowledging importance of environmental decisions in shaping
standing doctrine).
67. Id. (explaining how environmental laws allowed private citizens to sue
government).
68. See id. (discussing private citizen suit provisions).
69. See Long, supra note 64 at 84 (describing importance of environmental
policy on doctrine of standing).
70. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (holding plaintiffs lacked
standing).
71. See id. at 732 (applying doctrine of standing to environmental law).
72. Id. at 729-30 (describing plaintiff’s purpose in bringing suit).
73. Id. (explaining plaintiff’s main complaint).
74. Id. at 729 (listing amenities of proposed ski resort).
75. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 729-30 (explaining environmental concerns raised
by plaintiff).
76. See id. at 731 (explaining procedural history of case).
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reached the Supreme Court.77  In a landmark decision, the Court
stated that “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being” were valid
injuries for standing purposes.78  The Court, however, concluded
the Sierra Club lacked standing to bring the case because it failed
to plead facts that showed the organization or any of its members
were actually among the people injured by the proposed ski re-
sort.79  In what seemed like a one step forward, two steps backward
decision, the Court recognized harm to the environment as a valid
injury but limited the class of plaintiffs who could bring suits to only
people who were personally affected by the harm to the environ-
ment.80  Environmentalists viewed the case as a win because as long
as plaintiffs plead that they visited or used the areas affected by the
action, their case would survive a standing challenge.81
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court decided several cases, tighten-
ing the requirements for proving standing in environmental law.82
The first case, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,83 presented a nar-
row view of the types of environmental claims a plaintiff could bring
to court.84  The National Wildlife Federation brought a claim
against the Director of the Bureau of Land Management for viola-
tions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).85  The plaintiffs claimed the defendants violated FLPMA
and NEPA when they reclassified a stretch of public lands as open
to mining activity.86  The plaintiffs were concerned that in reclassi-
fying the lands, the “natural beauty” of the area would be affected
and the environment as a whole would suffer severe
consequences.87
77. Id. (explaining how case reached Supreme Court).
78. Id. at 734 (stating environmental wellbeing is a valid cause of action).
79. Id. at 735, 740 (holding Sierra Club lacked personal stake in action and
thus had no standing).
80. See generally Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739, 740 (recognizing harm to environ-
ment as valid claim but still requiring personal stake in controversy).
81. See Emily Longfellow, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A
New Look at Environmental Standing, 24 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 3, 18 (2000)
(explaining why Sierra Club decision was favorable for environmentalists).
82. Id. at 18-19 (explaining tightening of standing doctrine within environ-
mental law context).
83. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (holding plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge government’s actions).
84. See Longfellow, supra note 81, at 19 (describing restrictions placed on en-
vironmental law standing as result of Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n).
85. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 875 (stating plaintiffs’ cause of action).
86. Id. at 879 (listing plaintiff’s claims).
87. Id. (describing plaintiff’s concerns on how mining activity would ruin
land).
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After some debate in the lower courts, the Supreme Court fi-
nally granted certiorari.88  The Court granted summary judgment
to the defendants, holding the plaintiffs did not have standing.89
Since the case was at the summary judgment stage, the Court ex-
plained that the plaintiffs’ affidavits had to show “specific facts sup-
porting . . . allegations,” as opposed to the general claims that
would be acceptable at the motion to dismiss stage.90  The plaintiffs
presented affidavits from two individuals, Peggy Kay Peterson and
Richard Erman, who claimed to use the lands in the vicinity.91
However the Court held the affidavits only supported a finding that
the individuals used “unspecified portions of an immense tract of
territory,” which was not specific enough to survive a summary judg-
ment motion.92
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,93 the Supreme Court revisited
the issue of standing in the context of environmental law.94  Several
organizations dedicated to wildlife preservation and other environ-
mental causes, brought an action against the Secretary of the Inte-
rior for violations of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).95  The
plaintiffs argued the actions of the Secretary of the Interior
threatened to increase the rate of extinction of endangered species
abroad.96  The plaintiffs previously visited the areas that housed the
endangered animals and planned to return in the future to view the
endangered animals.97  Ultimately, plaintiffs lacked standing be-
cause although the Court recognized the alleged injury as valid, the
intent to “some day” return to the area did not amount to immi-
nent harm.98  In reaching this conclusion, the Court heavily
88. Id. at 880-82 (discussing procedural history of case).
89. Id. at 889 (holding plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not provide
sufficient proof of harm).
90. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 884, 888, 890 (comparing pleading stan-
dards at motion to dismiss stage and summary judgment stage).
91. Id. at 880 (describing contents of plaintiffs’ affidavits).
92. Id. (holding affidavits saying plaintiffs used general vicinity around lands
were not specific enough to support standing).
93. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding plaintiffs did not
have standing to sue Secretary of the Interior).
94. See generally id. at 560-61 (discussing framework of standing doctrine in
environmental caselaw).
95. See id. at 558 (describing claims raised by plaintiffs).
96. See id. (explaining how rule promulgated by Secretary of the Interior
would only protect endangered animals within United States).
97. See id. at 563-64 (mentioning content of plaintiffs’ affidavits and their
statements of wanting to travel to visit endangered animals abroad).
98. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 (holding absent more specific plan by
plaintiffs, hopes of one day returning to endangered animals was not imminent
harm for standing purposes); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488,
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weighed the plaintiffs’ lack of “concrete plans” or indication of a
date on which they planned to visit the affected areas again.99
In a separate concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed the plaintiffs
did not have a claim, but strictly limited his opinion to the substan-
tive legal merits of the claim.100  Justice Stevens advocated for apply-
ing the imminent harm element of a standing claim differently in
environmental cases.101  Instead of measuring imminent harm by
the time passed between the “present and the time when the indi-
viduals would visit the area,” Justice Stevens argued the imminence
should be judged by the timing of the alleged harm on the environ-
ment.102  In other words, imminent harm would be judged by when
the alleged harm would happen to the environment and not by
when the plaintiffs alleged they would return to the harmed
area.103
In the early 2000s, the Supreme Court clarified the standing
doctrine in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental (TOC),
Inc.104  Several environmental groups, including the organization
Friends of the Earth, filed suit against Laidlaw Environmental Ser-
vices (Laidlaw) for violations of the Clean Water Act.105  In decid-
ing the case, the Court discussed both mootness and standing.106
496 (2009) (reiterating vague plans to return to area, including “some day” inten-
tions are insufficient to support finding of imminent harm for standing purposes).
“Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed
even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of
the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at
564.
99. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 (noting failure of plaintiffs to provide re-
turn date to affected area proved fatal to their claim).
100. Id. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority on find-
ing plaintiffs did not have standing to bring claim).  Justice Stevens agreed with the
majority finding that the plaintiffs could not bring the claim, but Justice Stevens
limited his opinion to stating the ESA did not apply internationally, and thus, the
plaintiffs did not have a valid claim. Id. (approving majority’s finding of ESA not
applying internationally). However, Justice Stevens, disagreed with the majority on
the standing issue, and instead opined that the plaintiffs met the threshold for
showing standing. Id. (concluding plaintiffs met all elements of standing).
101. Id. (advocating for imminent harm element to apply to environment and
not plaintiffs themselves).
102. Id. (describing proposed standard for finding standing in environmental
cases).
103. See id. (outlining how courts should judge imminent harm standard in
environmental cases).
104. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167 (2000)(holding plaintiffs had standing due to personal injury caused by defen-
dant’s actions).
105. Id. at 177 (describing factual developments that led to lawsuit).
106. Id. at 180 (explaining Court’s need to address both mootness and
standing).
12
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Regarding standing, the Court clarified that the relevant inquiry
was “not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff” stem-
ming from the defendant’s actions.107  The Court held that the
plaintiffs had alleged credible personal harm from the defendant’s
unlawful discharge of pollutants into water that the plaintiffs used
for recreational purposes.108
C. Ninth Circuit Precedent on Standing
According to some legal scholars, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals is arguably the most influential appellate court with respect
to environmental law cases.109  The court’s record in deciding cru-
cial environmental law cases surpasses the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals’ decisions, which is regarded as the second most influential
federal court.110  Consequently, the court has decided several envi-
ronmental law cases that have shaped environmental law on a na-
tional level.111  Additionally, the court is typically seen as a “pro-
environmental circuit,” and its liberal stance on standing and envi-
ronmental issues lies in stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s
views.112
One important environmental case decided by the Ninth Cir-
cuit was Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne,113 which dis-
107. Id. at 181 (clarifying that plaintiff had to prove personal injury and not
general injury to environment).
108. Id. at 183-84 (finding plaintiffs had alleged credible and probable harm
to plaintiffs’ recreational use of waterways).
109. See, e.g., Richard Frank, The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Most Important
Environmental Law Decisions of 2017, LEGALPLANET (Jan. 3, 2018), https://legal-plan
et.org/2018/01/03/the-ninth-circuit-court-of-appeals-most-important-environmen
tal-law-decisions-of-2017/ (citing case law illustrating Ninth Circuit’s role in shap-
ing environmental law policy).
110. See generally id. (demonstrating Ninth Circuit’s significance in deciding
environmental law cases).
111. See generally id. (showing Ninth Circuit’s impact on environmental
policy).
112. See Eleanor Clift, The 9th Circuit Keeps Saying ‘No’ to Trump. No Wonder He’s
Racing to Reshape It in His Image, THE DAILY BEAST (May 24, 2018), https://www
.thedailybeast.com/the-9th-circuit-keeps-saying-no-to-trump-no-wonder-hes-racing-
to-reshape-it-in-his-image (discussing Ninth Circuit’s pro-environmental plaintiff
approach). See also Gregg Re, Trump reshapes long-liberal 9th Circuit, as Republican-
appointed judges gain seats on court, FOX NEWS (April 2, 2019), https://www.foxnews
.com/politics/trump-reshapes-9th-circuit-gop-judges-near-majority (discussing how
President Trump’s appointments are shaping Ninth Circuit into conservative
circuit).
113. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 707-08 (9th
Cir. 2009) (holding environmental organizations had standing to challenge Fish
and Wildlife Service regulations).
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cussed standing in the context of environmental law.114  In
Kempthorne, several plaintiffs, including the Center for Biological Di-
versity, filed suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(the Service).115  The Service had promulgated several regulations
that allowed for the “non-lethal take” of polar bears and walrus in
the Northern Coast of Alaska.116  In promulgating the regulations,
the Service concluded there would be minimal impact on the
“populations, recruitment, or survival of polar bears and walrus” in
the area.117  The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging they “viewed polar
bears and walrus in the region, enjoy[ed] doing so, and ha[d] plans
to return.”118  The plaintiffs specifically argued that the regulations
violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).119
The Ninth Circuit focused on the plaintiffs’ allegations that
they enjoyed viewing the polar bears in the area and planned to
return, concluding the plaintiffs had standing.120  Although the
plaintiffs never provided evidence of concrete plans to return to the
area, the court held the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of polar bears, geo-
graphic specificity of the affected area, and plans to return to see
the polar bears were sufficient to confer standing.121  However, the
Ninth Circuit did not discuss Defenders of Wildlife despite the similari-
ties in the cases’ facts and allegations.122
The Ninth Circuit has also heard influential cases on the issue
of standing outside the context of environmental law.123  One such
114. Id. (considering whether plaintiffs had standing to bring environmental
suit).
115. Id. at 706 (discussing background of case).  The Center for Biological
Diversity is an organization focused on protecting habitats for endangered species.
Id. (explaining mission of Center for Biological Diversity).
116. Id. at 705-06 (explaining recent regulations promulgated by Service).
“The term ‘take’ means to ‘harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass,
hunt, capture, or kill any marine animals.” Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13)
(2003)) (defining “take” under the Marine Mammal Protection Act).
117. Id. at 706 (noting Service findings regarding impact on polar bear
population).
118. Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 588 F.3d at 706 (recounting plaintiffs’
complaint).
119. Id. (noting basis of plaintiffs’ complaint).
120. See id. at 707-08 (holding plaintiffs had standing to challenge Service
action).
121. See id. (finding plaintiffs’ plans to someday return to view polar bears
were enough to prove standing).
122. See generally id. at 707 (failing to provide in-depth discussion of Defenders
of Wildlife other than quoting Justice Stevens concurrence).
123. See generally Jennifer Jackson et al., The Ninth Circuit Finds Inaccurate Credit
Reporting Alone Does Not Confer Article III Standing, JD SUPRA (Apr. 5, 2019), https:/
/www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ninth-circuit-finds-inaccurate-67472/ (discuss-
14
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case, In re Zappos.com, Inc.,124 dealt with the risk of future harm of
identity theft alleged by plaintiffs who had their “names, account
numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping ad-
dresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card informa-
tion” stolen by hackers.125  The district court dismissed the case for
lack of standing because the thieves had not yet used the informa-
tion.126 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed on appeal because the
plaintiffs sufficiently proved standing by alleging sufficient threat of
future identity theft.127
The court of appeals reasoned the risk of identity theft was suf-
ficiently conceivable as to support standing.128  The court grounded
its reasoning in Supreme Court precedent, which stated that a
plaintiff who complains of a future injury has standing if “the
threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a substantial
risk that the harm will occur.’”129  In reaching its decision, the
court explained the stolen information was sufficient for the hack-
ers to commit identity theft, and thus it was reasonable to conclude
that the risk of harm from identity theft was imminent.130
IV. LOOKING THROUGH THE LENS: THE DISTRICT
COURT’S ANALYSIS
The District Court of Alaska began its discussion of standing by
listing the requirements a plaintiff has to meet to successfully bring
a case to court.131  There are three separate prongs of the standing
ing Ninth Circuit impact on standing doctrine in Fair Credit Reporting Act cases);
Jeffrey Neuburger, Finding Article III Standing, Ninth Circuit Declines to Do an About-
Face in Illinois Biometric Privacy Class Action against Facebook, NAT’L LAW REV. (Aug. 9,
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/finding-article-iii-standing-ninth-cir
cuit-declines-to-do-about-face-illinois (discussing importance of Ninth Circuit deci-
sion on standing for data privacy cases).
124. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs
can sufficiently allege standing based on “risk of identity theft”).
125. Id. at 1023 (describing plaintiffs’ basis for filing suit).
126. Id. (dismissing case for lack of standing).
127. Id. (holding district court’s dismissal for lack of standing was reversed).
128. Id. at 1028 (finding risk of identity theft was enough to support standing
claim).
129. Id. at 1024 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158
(2014)) (discussing standard for proving standing in cases of future injury).
130. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d at 1028 (explaining why risk of future
harm in case was imminent enough to support standing).
131. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985, 995-96
(D. Alaska 2018) (listing requirements for standing).  To have standing, a plaintiff
must “(1) suffer[ ] an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” Id. at 996 (discussing three-pronged standing test).
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test, but the court only focused on the first prong: “injury in
fact.”132  After the court set up the legal framework for standing
and the parties’ main arguments, the court analyzed each separate
component of the “injury in fact” prong of the standing test.133
The court found the plaintiffs had met their burden of proving in-
jury in fact because they had shown harm that was (a) imminent,
(b) geographically specific, and (c) particularized.134  In reaching
its decision, the District Court of Alaska relied mainly on precedent
from the Ninth Circuit and only minimally discussed previous Su-
preme Court rulings on standing.135
A. Imminent Harm
For the first element, imminent harm, the district court stated
that at the motion to dismiss stage, the standard set by the Ninth
Circuit allows a plaintiff to plead general facts of injury.136  The
court explained that if a plaintiff makes an allegation of future
harm, however, the plaintiff must show the injury was “certainly im-
pending” or there was a “substantial risk that the harm will oc-
cur.”137  After explaining the standard for allegations of future
harm, the court acknowledged the defendants’ argument that there
was no risk of “imminent harm” in the present case because to ob-
tain leases and drilling permits, there were several steps that
needed to be taken first.138  The court, relying on the “certainly
impending” rationale from In re Zappos.com, Inc., found the defend-
132. Id. (concentrating discussion on injury in fact prong of standing test).  In
its discussion of standing, the court only focused on the “injury in fact” prong and
the requirements necessary to prove that prong of the standing test. See generally
id. (focusing discussion on imminent harm, geographic specificity, and particular-
ized harm requirements of injury in fact).
133. Id. at 996-1001 (analyzing each element of standing claim).
134. Id. at 1001 (holding plaintiffs had met every component of injury in fact
prong of standing test).
135. See generally id. at 996-1001 (focusing on discussion of Ninth Circuit pre-
cedent without discussing Supreme Court precedent).  The court only mentioned
Supreme Court precedent to outline the test for standing but focused their appli-
cation on Ninth Circuit precedent regarding standing. See generally id. (focusing
application on precedent from Kempthorne and In re Zappos.com, Inc.).
136. League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 996 (explaining standard
for imminent harm).  “[O]n a motion to dismiss [the court] presume[s] that gen-
eral allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the
claim.” Id. (describing how plaintiffs plead facts to survive motion to dismiss).
137. Id. (applying test from in In re Zappos.com, Inc. to show how plaintiffs can
prove standing based on future harm claim).
138. Id. (discussing defendants’ view on imminent harm element).
16
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ants’ arguments unpersuasive in light of the risk of severe environ-
mental harm stemming from Trump’s Order.139
The court reasoned that even though there were steps third
parties had to take before they were granted seismic surveying per-
mits, the facts pointed to the government expediting those permits
and causing imminent harm.140  To reach this decision, the court
examined all of the factual developments that occurred since the
execution of Trump’s Order.141  First, the court highlighted how
Trump’s Order instructed the Secretary of the Interior to expedite
seismic surveying permits, conduct annual lease sales of Artic and
Atlantic Oceans, and “direct[ ] [a] review of offshore safety and pol-
lution-control regulations and guidance documents.”142  The court
reasoned these requisites imposed by Trump’s Order showed that
“oil and gas exploration activities are intended to be imminent,”
thus leading to the reasonable conclusion that the harm was “cer-
tainly impending.”143
Second, the district court showed great interest in the plain-
tiffs’ factual allegations that the oil industry was already preparing
oil explorations in the lands.144  The court highlighted the plain-
tiffs’ allegations discussing industry interest in conducting seismic
surveys in the lands.145  In discussing these developments, the court
paid particular attention to the harmful effects of seismic survey-
ing.146  Of the harmful effects noted, the court discussed how loud
pulses from seismic surveying airguns would result in hearing loss
139. Id. at 997 (discussing why situation was comparable to In re Zappos.com,
Inc.). See generally In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2018) (ex-
plaining standard for future harm to be certainly impending).
140. See League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 997 (reasoning
Trump’s Order showed government would promptly grant permits for oil and gas
exploration).
141. Id. at 997-99 (narrating factual developments and how they amounted to
imminent harm).
142. Id. at 997-98 (describing requisites established by Trump’s Order).
143. See id. at 998 (highlighting effects of Trump’s Order).
144. See id. (granting great weight to plaintiffs’ allegations of oil industry activ-
ity following Trump’s Order).
145. See League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 998 (noting plaintiffs’
allegations of industry interest in surveying OCS lands).  “[I]ndustry trade group
called for seismic surveying in the Atlantic and other frontier areas to proceed
‘without delay . . . .’” One seismic operator had already asked for permission to
conduct 3-D seismic surveying, and several companies had “applied for permits to
conduct deep penetration seismic surveys. . . .” Id. (highlighting industry interest
in beginning seismic survey exploration immediately).
146. Id. (noting effects of seismic surveying).
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and increase mortality rates to the marine wildlife in the OCS
lands.147
Lastly, the court used evidence of past oil and gas activity to
demonstrate the risk from seismic surveying was imminent.148  In
reaching this conclusion, the District Court of Alaska noted past
actions taken by industry trade groups regarding seismic surveying
activity.149  The court found the timeline weighed in favor of find-
ing a risk of imminent harm.150  Specifically, past actions by indus-
try leaders showed companies tend to secure permission to conduct
seismic surveying years in advance of the government actually leas-
ing the lands.151  Evidence showed seismic surveying happens at
least two to four years prior to the leasing of lands because the pur-
pose of surveying is to discover whether the area has promising oil
prospects.152  The court explained all of the evidence supported
plaintiffs rightful fear that seismic surveying would begin immi-
nently and would cause irreparable harm to the marine wildlife in
the area.153  The court concluded the imminent harm element of
the standing doctrine had been met.154
B. Geographic Specificity
The court relied mainly on the Ninth Circuit decision in
Kempthorne to find that the plaintiffs had alleged a “geographically
specific” injury.155  As the Ninth Circuit set out in Kempthorne, the
court found the “degree of geographic specificity required depends
147. Id. (describing process of seismic surveying and its effects).  The court
described the harmful effects of seismic surveying as follows:
Seismic surveying associated with oil and gas activities uses very loud, fre-
quent sound pulses from airgun arrays to map the geology of the sea
floor and identify potential oil and gas deposits . . . . Noise from seismic
operations harms marine mammals. If animals are exposed to high
enough levels of sound, such as exist close to some seismic airguns, they
can suffer shifts in hearing thresholds and hearing loss that may result in
mortality . . . . Seismic surveys also harm commercially important fish and
shellfish.
Id. (enumerating impact on marine wildlife).
148. Id. at 998-99 (stating previous oil and gas drilling activities weighed in
favor of finding imminent harm).
149. See id. (using history as indicator for present action).
150. See League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 998-99 (discussing
timeline of seismic surveying in past oil drilling activity).
151. Id. (explaining timeline for securing seismic surveying permits).
152. Id. at 999 (describing purpose behind seismic surveying of lands).
153. Id. (deciding imminent harm was likely).
154. Id. (concluding plaintiffs met their burden regarding imminent harm
element of standing claim).
155. See generally League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 999-1000 (ana-
lyzing geographic specificity under framework set by Ninth Circuit decision).
18
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on the size of the area that is impacted by the governments ac-
tion.”156  The court found the area was discrete and well defined
despite the geographic area being 128 million acres.157  Since the
plaintiffs claimed to use parts of the withdrawn OCS lands, the
court concluded geographic specificity was met.158
C. Particularized Harm
Finally, the District Court of Alaska addressed the defendants’
concerns that the plaintiffs’ interest in “visiting, using, inhabiting,
studying, and recreating in” the withdrawn lands was not a particu-
larized harm.159  However, the court held the harm caused to the
plaintiffs by the oil and gas exploration was personal and amounted
to particularized harm.160  Again, the court focused primarily on
the Ninth Circuit’s Kempthorne holding in deciding this case and
only briefly discussed any relevant Supreme Court cases.161  The
court quoted Defenders of Wildlife and Friends of the Earth, Inc. to sup-
port the position that for standing plaintiffs must prove personal
harm and injury to themselves rather than injury to environ-
ment.162  Environmental plaintiffs must show they use the affected
lands and they are “persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recrea-
tional values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity”
to show standing.163
The court then discussed Kempthorne and how the Ninth Cir-
cuit found the plaintiffs in that case had standing after alleging
facts similar to those of this case.164  In discussing the facts of this
156. Id. at 1000 (restating geographic specificity standard set out by Ninth
Circuit).
157. Id. (finding plaintiffs defined discrete area of land).
158. Id. (holding geographic specificity was met).  “Plaintiffs, similar to the
plaintiffs in Kempthorne, allege that they “visit or otherwise use and enjoy the Atlan-
tic Ocean, including near deepwater canyons, the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, and
coastal regions adjacent to these waters.” Id.  The court found that the plaintiffs
claimed use of the lands or the lands in the vicinity was enough to meet geo-
graphic specificity. Id. (reasoning Ninth Circuit precedent allowed court to find
for plaintiffs).
159. Id. at 1000-01 (discussing defendants’ third and final argument on plain-
tiffs’ lack of standing).
160. League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 1001 (holding plaintiffs
pled sufficient facts to support finding of particularized harm).
161. See id. at 1000 (discussing Supreme Court precedent but relying on
Ninth Circuit precedent instead).
162. Id. (discussing Supreme Court standard that plaintiffs must show harm
to themselves, not general harm to environment).
163. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000)) (explaining standard set by Supreme Court).
164. See id. at 1000-01 (analogizing Kempthorne’s facts to those of League of Con-
servation Voters).
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case, the court concentrated on the plaintiffs’ concerns over the
harmful effects of seismic surveying on animal wildlife in the af-
fected lands.165  The district court reasoned that because the plain-
tiffs used or visited the withdrawn lands, any harm caused to the
animals in the lands would affect the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the
lands.166
After finding that the plaintiffs had met their burden by estab-
lishing (a) imminent harm, (b) geographic specificity, and (c) par-
ticularized harm, the court held the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled
facts to survive a motion to dismiss.167  Although the defendants
raised the issue of standing again at the summary judgment stage,
the court, relying on the “law of the case doctrine,” found it could
not revisit the issue.168  Thus, the court held its earlier ruling on
standing at the motion to dismiss stage remained undisturbed at
the summary judgment stage.169
165. See League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 1000-01 (weighing
heavily plaintiffs’ concerns that seismic surveying would cause hearing loss as well
as death to animals in affected lands).
166. Id. at 1001 (describing harmful effects plaintiffs could suffer).  The court
was interested in the plaintiffs’ allegations, including that:
[M]embers of the Plaintiff organizations visit or otherwise use and enjoy
the Atlantic Ocean, including near deepwater canyons, the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas . . . . Any activities, such as oil and gas exploration or devel-
opment, including seismic surveying, that destroy, degrade, or diminish
the wild and natural state of these areas, or that kill, injure, harm, harass,
or displace wildlife, also interfere with Plaintiffs’ members’ use and enjoy-
ment of the areas and associated wildlife. As such, these activities directly
and irreparably injure the interests of Plaintiffs’ members.
Id. (specifying plaintiff’s alleged personal harms).
167. Id. at 1004 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss).
168. See League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1019-
20 (D. Alaska, 2019) (holding standing had already been decided stage and law of
the case doctrine prevented court from revisiting it).  The law of the case doctrine
stands for the proposition that once an appellate court decides an issue in a partic-
ular case and remands the case to the lower court, the lower court cannot revisit
the issue because the decision from the appellate court has  become “the law of
the case.”
18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 4478 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2019) (explaining law of the case doctrine and
how lower courts apply it).  There are similar applications of the law of the case
doctrine that state once a court decides an issue at the beginning stages of a case,
the court should not revisit the issue unless a set of specific circumstances are met.
Id. (detailing criteria that must be met before court can revisit issue).
169. See generally League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1019-20 (de-
clining to reconsider standing issue at summary judgment stage).
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V. CAPTURING THE PERFECT ANGLE: LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION
VOTERS APPROPRIATELY SHIFTS STANDING TEST
TO ENVIRONMENTAL INJURY
The District Court of Alaska’s discussion of standing in League
of Conservation Voters is grounded in Ninth Circuit precedent that
stands in stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s precedent on stand-
ing in environmental cases.170  Despite the district court applying
the same test the Supreme Court applied in Defenders of Wildlife, the
district court came to a conclusion that initially seems to be unsup-
ported by any binding precedent.171  To understand the decision, it
is critical to understand first how the courts in Kempthorne and De-
fenders of Wildlife came to different conclusions, despite both cases
having similar facts.172
At first glance, League of Conservation Voters, Kempthorne, and De-
fenders of Wildlife seem irreconcilable due to the similarity in their
facts and their different holdings.173 However, upon close examina-
tion the holdings are different not because they applied different
standards or tests, but because of who the tests were applied to.174
When addressing an environmental standing claim, the relevant in-
quiry is “not injury to the environment but injury to the
plaintiff.”175
In holding the plaintiffs lacked standing, the Court in Defenders
of Wildlife focused on the lack of imminent harm to the plaintiffs,
170. See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (discuss-
ing why intention of returning “some day” to affected area did not amount to
standing); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 707-08
(9th Cir. 2009) (finding plaintiffs had standing despite having facts similar to Defs.
of Wildlife).
171. See generally League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 996-1001 (ap-
plying same standing test as Defs. of Wildlife but reaching different conclusion).
172. Compare Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-64 (finding plaintiffs’ lack of con-
crete plans to visit affected area meant they had no standing), with Kempthorne, 588
F.3d at 707-08 (finding plaintiffs had standing despite having no concrete plans to
visit affected area)
173. Compare Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-64 (holding lack of concrete
plans was critical to dismissal of claim), with Kempthorne, 588 F.3d at 707-08 (failing
to address lack of concrete plans to visit affected area), and League of Conservation
Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 996-1001 (ignoring plaintiffs’ lack of plans to visit affected
area).
174. Compare Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-64 (discussing lack of imminent
harm to plaintiffs), with Kempthorne, 588 F.3d at 707-08 (focusing on imminent
harm to environment instead of imminent harm to plaintiffs), and League of Conser-
vation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 996-1001 (concentrating analysis on alleged immi-
nent harm to environment).
175. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 181 (2000) (holding test for environmental standing is showing injury to
plaintiff not environment).
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regardless of the imminent harm to the environment.176  Based on
this reasoning, the Court found that because the plaintiffs did not
have concrete plans to return to the area, any imminent harm to
the environment would not result in imminent harm to the plain-
tiffs.177  Similarly, in Friends of the Earth, the Court focused on
whether the plaintiffs suffered harm, separate from the question of
whether the violations of the Clean Water Act had caused harm to
the environment.178  Thus, according to the Court, focus should be
on whether the plaintiffs are likely to be harmed, irrespective of any
alleged harm to the environment.179
In Kempthorne, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of standing con-
flated the imminent harm and particularized harm elements of a
standing claim and left lower courts with a decision that muddled
the legal framework of standing in environmental cases.180 Addi-
tionally, the court in Kempthorne did not attempt to differentiate the
facts of the case from those in Defenders of Wildlife, despite the sub-
stantial similarities.181  Because of this, lower courts within the
Ninth Circuit are left with the difficult task of trying to differentiate
between Kempthorne and Defenders of Wildlife and deciding which to
apply in a particular situation.182
Due to the confusing nature of the standing doctrine, it is no
surprise the District Court of Alaska struggled to apply the doctrine
in its League of Conservation Voters decision.183  Although the decision
is a win for the environment, it is apparent the district court’s dis-
cussion is flawed when it is broken down and analyzed.184  First, the
176. See Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563-64 (finding plaintiffs must present
facts showing they are harmed by actions of defendants).
177. Id. at 564 (holding intentions to “some day” return to affected area did
not support finding of standing).
178. See Friends of the Earth Inc., 528 U.S. at 181 (stating focus was on whether
plaintiffs had suffered harm).
179. Id. (reiterating correct test to apply is whether plaintiffs will suffer immi-
nent harm from defendants’ actions).
180. See generally Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701,
707-08 (9th Cir. 2009) (failing to separate imminent harm discussion from particu-
larized harm discussion).
181. See id. (lacking discussion of Defs. of Wildlife other than citing
concurrence).
182. See generally Amy C. Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1713-14 (2013) (explaining intricacies of precedent and stare
decisis doctrine); see also League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d
985, 996-1001 (D. Alaska 2018) (basing discussion on Kempthorne even though Def’s
of Wildlife Supreme Court precedent applied to case).
183. For a discussion of the intricacies of the standing doctrine in environ-
mental law, see supra notes 66-108 and accompanying text.
184. See generally League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 996-1001 (fo-
cusing discussion on imminent harm to environment rather than plaintiffs’).
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court’s discussion of imminent harm to the environment stemming
from Trump’s Order was correct because there was a very high
probability of imminent harm to the environment.185  Second, the
court was correct in finding the plaintiffs suffered particularized
harm due to their interests in “visiting . . . and recreating in” the
area because, like the Supreme Court held in Sierra Club, aesthetic
enjoyment of the environment is a cognizable interest.186
However, the court failed to combine the two prongs to decide
whether there was imminent and particularized harm to the plain-
tiffs and not just to the environment.187  Had the court applied the
imminent harm test to the plaintiffs and not to the environment,
the outcome of the case would have been different.188  First, the
discussion of imminent harm would not have revolved around
whether Trump’s Order would have any immediate effects on the
wildlife that lived on the OCS lands.189  Instead, the dialogue would
have centered on whether the plaintiffs had any concrete plans to
return to the OCS lands, and whether those plans led the court to
believe the plaintiffs would suffer a personal harm because of
Trump’s Order.190
Second, if the discussion had involved whether the plaintiffs
had any concrete plans to return to the OCS lands, the district
court would have had to rely heavily on the Defenders of Wildlife pre-
cedent to determine if there was imminent harm.191  Since the
plaintiffs relied on the argument that harm to the environment was
impending, there was little discussion of the plaintiffs’ plans to re-
turn to the OCS lands.192  Although the plaintiffs’ alleged their
members visited and used the OCS lands, the complaint failed to
185. See id. at 998-1001 (finding seismic surveying from Trump’s Order would
have negative effects on environment).
186. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (reasoning aesthetic
enjoyment of environment could be protected); see also League of Conservation Vot-
ers, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 1000-01 (holding plaintiffs had shown particularized harm).
187. See League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 996-1001 (applying
imminent harm prong to environment and particularized harm prong to
plaintiffs).
188. See generally id. at 996-99 (applying imminent harm test to environment
but not to plaintiffs).
189. See id. (focusing on effects of oil drilling on environment).
190. See generally id. at 1001 (noting plaintiffs’ recognized interest in enjoying
OCS lands but failing to address plaintiffs’ lack of plans to return to area).
191. See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-64 (1992) (pro-
viding guidance on relevant inquiry used to determine imminent harm to plaintiffs
in environmental cases).
192. See League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 997-99 (arguing
Trump’s Order had immediate effect of allowing oil exploration on OCS lands but
failing to address how that would imminently affect plaintiffs).
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indicate that the members had concrete plans of returning to the
OCS lands in the near future.193  Thus, based on the Supreme
Court decision in Defenders of Wildlife, the court should have found
the general allegations that land would one day be harmed by
Trump’s Order did not meet the threshold to prove imminent
harm to the plaintiffs.194
However, the district court’s reasoning aligned with Justice Ste-
vens’ concurring opinion in Defenders of Wildlife.195  As proposed by
Justice Stevens, imminent harm in environmental cases should be
judged by when the harm to the environment occurs, rather than
by the timing of the plaintiff’s next visit to the affected area.196
This standard better supports the standing doctrine purpose of af-
firming that only plaintiffs who have suffered a personal harm can
bring a claim to court.197  Like Justice Stevens argued in his concur-
rence, the harm to a person interested in visiting an area
threatened by adverse environmental activity occurs as soon as the
environment is affected.198
There is no constitutionally derived logic in allowing recovery
to a hypothetical plaintiff who has designated a day to visit an envi-
ronmental area, yet denying recovery to the hypothetical plaintiff
who has plans to visit, but has not finalized a date yet.199  Both
plaintiffs have been personally affected by the environmental harm,
yet under Supreme Court precedent, only the plaintiff who desig-
nated a day for the visit will be allowed recovery.200  Under League of
Conservation Voters, it would be irrelevant if the hypothetical plaintiff
193. See id. at 1001 (discussing plaintiffs’ use of OCS lands but failing to note
plaintiffs’ lack of plans to return to area).
194. Compare Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-64 (holding plaintiffs lacked
standing because they did not provide evidence of concrete plans to return to
affected area), with League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 996-1001 (hold-
ing plaintiffs had standing despite not showing concrete plans to return to affected
area).
195. See generally Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating courts should focus on when harm will happen to environment as opposed
to when plaintiffs will travel to affected area).
196. Id. (advocating for different application standard in environmental
standing claims).
197. Id. at 583 (explaining why this approach aligns with standing doctrine’s
purpose).
198. See id. at 582-83 (reasoning that harm to person interested in viewing
endangered animals occurs as soon as animals or animals’ habitats are affected).
199. See generally id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (acknowledging
it might be trivial to base standing decision on whether plaintiffs have bought
plane ticket or announced day to visit affected area).
200. See generally Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 (indicating plaintiffs’ lack of
concrete plans to return to affected area requires court to find no standing for
claim).
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designated a day for the visit because the imminence of the harm
would instead be measured by when the alleged harm to the envi-
ronment occurs — a standard that better protects the environment,
while still complying with the principles of the standing doctrine.201
VI. DEVELOPING THE IMAGE: LASTING IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF
THE STANDING DOCTRINE
Although it is a district court decision, League of Conservation
Voters has the power to effectuate great change in the legal frame-
work for analyzing standing in environmental cases.202  First, the
decision is a major victory for environmental activism.203  By focus-
ing on the imminent harm to the environment, the court has pro-
posed a standard that can allow citizens to better protect the
environment.204  Plaintiffs can focus on demonstrating the harmful
effects the action will have on the environment, instead of concen-
trating their efforts on trying to show that they will promptly visit
the affected area.205  The burden of proving harm to the environ-
ment is an easier threshold to meet, which means plaintiffs will
have an easier time bringing claims that will benefit the
environment.206
Additionally, because this decision has been appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, the court of appeals will have to reevaluate its caselaw
to see if League of Conservation Voters aligns with its precedent.207
With the support of the Kempthorne precedent and the Ninth Cir-
201. See League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985, 996-
1001 (D. Alaska 2018) (applying standing test that focuses on imminent harm to
environment rather than emphasizing when plaintiff plans to visit affected area);
see also Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (advocating for
standing test that focuses on harm to environment because this test protects envi-
ronment while still complying with standing doctrine principles).
202. For a further discussion of the standing test applied in League of Conserva-
tion Voters and how it can affect plaintiffs bringing suits that may benefit the envi-
ronment, see supra notes 183-201 and accompanying text.
203. For a discussion of why the correct standard is judging imminent harm
by when the harm happens to the environment, see supra notes 195-201 and ac-
companying text.
204. See id. (discussing why standard proposed by Justice Stevens plus subse-
quently adopted by League of Conservation Voters is appropriate for environmental
law cases).
205. For a discussion of what plaintiffs would have to show if the League of
Conservation Voters standard is affirmed, see supra notes 196-201 and accompanying
text.
206. Cf. Stacy Jane Schaefer, The Standing of Nature: The Delineated Natural
Ecosystem Proxy, 9 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 70 (2018) (describing why
plaintiffs meeting threshold of showing personal harm in environmental standing
cases presents tough burden).
207. See supra note 51 discussing procedural stage in case.
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cuit’s tendency to take a pro-environmental plaintiff approach, the
League of Conservation Voters decision is likely to be affirmed in the
Ninth Circuit.208  As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit is al-
ready one of the most active circuits when it comes to environmen-
tal caselaw.209  If the court of appeals upholds the League of
Conservation Voters decision, it will open the door for plaintiffs to
bring subsequent pro-environment claims to the Ninth Circuit be-
cause the burden of proving standing will be easier, and plaintiffs
will have a greater chance of surviving a standing challenge.210
Lastly, due to the Trump administration’s emphasis on pro-
moting oil drilling in OCS lands, if the Ninth Circuit affirms the
decision, the Trump administration is likely to appeal the case to
the Supreme Court.211  The Supreme Court has not decided a case
involving standing for individual environmental plaintiffs since its
decision in Defenders of Wildlife.212  Any decision to review the League
of Conservation Voters case will likely upend precedent that has re-
mained undisturbed for over twenty-seven years.213  While League of
Conservation Voters  is still just a district court decision, due to the
fierce debate over oil drilling in the United States and the current
administration’s focus on remaining at the forefront of oil drilling
activity, the decision has the propensity to implicate even the high-
est court in the nation and usher in a new era for environmental
plaintiffs.214
Monica P. Matias Quin˜ones*
208. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s precedent and stance on the
standing doctrine, see supra notes 109-130 and accompanying text. See also Clift,
supra note 112 (describing Ninth Circuit’s pro-environmental plaintiff approach).
209. See Frank, supra note 109 (noting Ninth Circuit’s active role in shaping
environmental policy).
210. For an analysis of the League of Conservation Voters decision and its effects
on plaintiffs seeking to establish standing, see supra note 201 and accompanying
text.
211. For a discussion of Trump administration’s emphasis on remaining
world leader in energy developments, see supra note 35 and accompanying text
212. For an in depth discussion of environmental standing cases decided by
the Supreme Court, see supra notes 66-108 and accompanying text.
213. See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (deciding case
in 1992 and holding to survive standing challenge individual environmental plain-
tiffs need to show concrete plans of return to affected area to survive standing
challenge).
214. See generally OCS Lands Act History, supra note 1 (explaining history of oil
drilling); see also Exec. Order No. 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 (April 2017) (outlin-
ing Trump administration’s focus on promoting oil drilling activity).
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